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Abstract
We develop a model to explain two-way migration of high-skilled individuals between coun-
tries that are similar in their economic characteristics. High-skilled migration is explained
by a combination of two features: In both countries there is a continuum of workers with dif-
fering abilities, which are private knowledge, and the production technology gives incentives
to ﬁrms for hiring workers of similar ability. In the presence on migration cost, high-skilled
workers self-select into the group of migrants, thereby ensuring they are hired together with
other high-skilled migrants. The laissez-faire equilibrium features too much migration, ex-
plained by a negative migration externality, and as a result all individuals are worse oﬀ than
in autarky. We also show that for suﬃciently low levels of migration cost the optimal level
of migration is strictly positive. In extensions to our basic model, we consider the presence
of an internationally immobile factor and ﬁnd that in this case the possibility of aggregate
gains from migration in the laissez-faire equilibrium emerges. We also show that our basic
results are robust with respect to small diﬀerences in countries’ technologies.
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In this paper we develop a model to explain two-way migration of high-skilled individuals be-
tween developed countries. While this phenomenon has received little attention in the theoretical
literature, there is strong evidence that it is quantitatively important. With respect to the rel-
ative importance of high-skilled migration, Docquier and Marfouk (2004) report a world-wide
average emigration rate of skilled workers for the year 2000 of 5.47 percent, more than three
times larger than the average emigration rate of all workers and almost six times larger than
the emigration rate of low-skilled workers. Lowell (2007) reports a net increase of two million
tertiary-educated adults who migrated between developed countries for the time span from 1975
to 2005 which is equivalent to an increase of 40%. With respect to the two-way nature of high-
skilled migration, Figure 3.8 in OECD (2008) shows that the largest destination countries for
high-skilled migration, the U.S. and Canada, have substantial emigration of high-skilled individ-
uals as well. Even more remarkably, for the United Kingdom and Germany inward and outward
migration of high-skilled individuals are very similar.
The key challenge in explaining two-way migration of similar (highly skilled) individuals
within a group of similar (high-income) countries – rather than one-way migration from devel-
oping to developed countries – lies in the fact that country diﬀerences cannot be expected to play
a central role. The model we develop in the main part of this paper therefore uses the assump-
tion that countries are identical in all respects (this assumption is relaxed later on). In both
countries there is a continuum of workers with diﬀering abilities, which are private knowledge.
The production technology, borrowed from Kremer (1993), exhibits complementarities between
the skill levels of individual workers, and proﬁt maximising ﬁrms therefore aim for hiring workers
of identical skill. Migration is costly, and the cost is the same for all individuals. High-skilled
individuals from both countries self-select into emigration in order to separate themselves from
low-skilled co-workers at home. Firms can distinguish natives and immigrants, which allows
them to form more eﬃcient matches, leading to larger wage premia for skilled workers.
The welfare eﬀects of migration in our model are stark: In the laissez-faire equilibrium all
individuals are worse oﬀ than in autarky. This result is due to a negative migration externality,
which leads to too much migration in equilibrium. In particular, for the marginal migrant the
1cost of migration is equal to the expected individual wage gain due to the prospect of being
matched with more able co-workers. The marginal migrant rationally ignores the fact that by
migrating he moves from being the most able native to being the least able migrant, thereby
lowering the average skill of both population groups and hence the expected wage of individuals
in both groups. We also show that for suﬃciently low migration cost the level of migration chosen
by an omniscient social planner is strictly positive (but of course lower than in the laissez-faire
equilibrium), since the existence of migrants as a distinct group of individuals enables ﬁrms to
match workers of more similar expected skill.1 While aggregate gains from migration exist in
the social planner equilibrium, the distributional eﬀects are strong: all migrants gain relative to
autarky, while all natives are worse oﬀ. These distributional eﬀects are mitigated if the social
optimum is implemented via a migration tax, since in this case the possibility of redistributing
part of the gains to non-migrants exists.
In an extension we add an internationally immobile factor (“capital”) that is essential in
production for all ﬁrms. We show that migration is potentially more benign in this case than
in our basic model, since it allows for the more eﬃcient allocation of capital between domestic
ﬁrms, with ﬁrms hiring migrants having a higher capital intensity due to a capital-skill comple-
mentary that is well known from many models of migration. There is a potentially oﬀsetting
eﬀect, however, since capital reallocation towards ﬁrms that hire migrants makes migration more
attractive, ceteris paribus. It is shown that aggregate welfare gains exist if capital is suﬃciently
important in production, and at the same time migration cost is suﬃciently low.
A second extension allows for small diﬀerences in countries’ technologies. By gaining access
to a better technology, workers from the low-tech country then have an additional incentive to
migrate, while the opposite holds true for workers from the high-tech economy. Incorporating
this modiﬁed incentive structure, we still ﬁnd two-way migration, which now is, however, biased
towards the technologically superior country, i.e. the high-tech country experiences net immigra-
tion while the low-tech country faces net emigration. Given cross country technology diﬀerences
and the associated gains from arbitrage, welfare prospects for workers from the low-tech county
1The option to migrate in our model eﬀectively serves as a costly screening device. See Spence (1973) and
Stiglitz (1975) for two of the seminal papers on screening.
2brighten up, while workers from the high-tech country are even more worse oﬀ than they were
in the baseline model. Notably, the result of our baseline model that too much migration occurs
in the laissez-faire equilibrium, continues to hold.
There are two types of supportive evidence for the main mechanism driving migration in our
model. First, the production technology we assume predicts skill clustering of workers within
ﬁrms. Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) ﬁnd evidence for such skill clustering, using a matched
employer-employee database covering most US business ﬁrms in 1990. They show that for the
average low-skilled, white worker the probability of being matched with another low-skilled,
white worker equals 53%, while the same probability for a high-skilled, white worker is only
33.1%. Under random asignment of workers to ﬁrms the probability of being matched with a
low-skilled, white worker is 41.3%, indicating extensive segregation by skill across ﬁrms. Second,
our model predicts a clustering of migrants within ﬁrms. Evidence for such workplace segregation
between natives and immigrants is again provided by Hellerstein and Neumark (2008), who ﬁnd
that 39.4% of Hispanics in the US have a coworker who is also a Hispanic, while only 4.5%
of the white workers have Hispanic coworkers. Comparing this to a probability of 6.9% for
having a Hispanic coworker under random matching reveals a substantial workplace segregation
by ethnicity. Similar results for workplace segregation between natives and immigrants are
provided by Andersson et al. (2010).2
To the best of our knowledge the only other theoretical paper that aims to explain two-way
migration of high-skilled individuals is the one by Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006). In their model,
individuals diﬀer in their abilities, and they choose to be either entrepreneurs or workers, as in
Lucas (1978). The career choice of individuals depends not only on their own ability, but also on
the relative ability distribution within each country. Migration occurs only if countries’ ability
distributions are suﬃciently diﬀerent, and interestingly the equilibrium may feature two-way
migration of both entrepreneurs and workers. In an equilibrium with two way migration these
individuals may well have the same role (entrepreneur or worker, respectively), but they have
2See Figure 1 in Andersson et al. (2010) for a plot of the cumulative ditribution of the immigrant coworker
share for natives and migrants, respectively, which signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the distribution that would result
under random assignment. Portes and Wilson (1980) ﬁnd early evidence for the clustering of Cubans in Cuban
owned ﬁrms in a study of Miami’s labor market.
3diﬀerent skill levels. Two-way migration of similar individuals in Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006)
is therefore of a very diﬀerent nature than in our model. Another paper dealing with two-way
migration between identical countries is Fan and Stark (2011). In this paper workers have no
skill dimension and migrate because they do not want people within their reference group to
observe them working in a job to which a certain social stigma is attached. Our paper is also
related to Hendricks (2001) and Giannetti (2003), who use the same basic selection mechanism
of high-skilled individuals into emigration as we do. But neither do these papers analyse two-
way migration of high-skilled individuals, nor are they interested in a welfare analysis, which is
the focus of our paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two derives the baseline model of two-way, high-skilled
migration between identical countries. The welfare eﬀects are derived in section three. Section
four considers two extension of the basic model to allow for non-mobile factors of production as
well as country asymmetries. Section ﬁve concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a world with two perfectly symmetric countries, each populated by a heterogeneous
mass of workers, which we normalize to one without loss of generality.3 Workers in each country
diﬀer with respect to their skills, s, which are uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1], and
which are assumed to be private information. We assume workers to be risk neutral, such that
utility, u(x) = x, can be expressed as a linear function of consumption, x. Each country is a
single sector economy producing a homogeneous numéraire good, y, under perfect competition,
which is costlessly traded.
Following Kremer (1993) we assume a production technology which reﬂects two basic as-
sumptions: (i) the production process consists of i = 1,   ,n tasks, which (ii) all must be
completed successfully in order to get some output. If only one task in a series of production
steps is not performed correctly, the value of the ﬁnal output good drops down to zero. The
production technology hence features an extreme form of complementarity. For simplicity we
assume that there are only two tasks, n = 2, and each task needs to be performed by a single
3Since countries are assumed to be symmetric, we suppress all country indices.
4worker. Whether a worker performs the task entrusted to him correctly depends on his skill
level, s ∈ [0,1], which serves as a proxy for the individual probability of performing a task
successfully.
We denote 2A as potential output that results when all tasks are performed correctly. Al-
ternatively, one can think of 2A as a term capturing total factor productivity. With the number
of tasks equal to 2 the parameter A would then be output per task if all tasks are performed
successfully. Output of a ﬁrm that performs the production process exactly once can then be
written as
y = f (s1,s2) = 2As1s2  (1)
Wages cannot be based on individual ability, since this is private information. Consequently each
worker is paid half the ﬁrm’s output independent of their actual contribution. In an equilibrium
that features migration, ﬁrms can identify an individual worker as a member of either the group
of natives or the group of immigrants. This is the only information they can base their hiring
decision on, and this information is valuable since, as we show below, the average skill of the




π (¯ s1, ¯ s2) = 2A¯ s1¯ s2 − w(¯ s1) − w(¯ s2), (2)
with ¯ si, i = 1,2, denoting the average skill of the group from which the worker for task i is
hired, and w(¯ si) the expected wage paid to this worker. Lemma 1 gives the solution to this
optimization problem.
Lemma 1 Firms maximize expected proﬁts by hiring workers of the same expected skill.
Proof See the appendix.
Using our proﬁt sharing rule, the expected wage rate of an individual worker with skill s equals
w(s) = A¯ sℓs  (3)
where ¯ sℓ with ℓ ∈ {L,H} is the average skill of the group to which the individual belongs. We
assume that migration is costly, and the cost is equal to c. It is now straightforward to show
that our model leads to self-selection of the most able individuals into emigration.
5To see this, consider some arbitrary cutoﬀ ability, ˜ s, that separates high-skill and low-skill
individuals. The average skills in the two groups L and H are ¯ sL = ˜ s/2 and ¯ sH = (1+ ˜ s)/2 due
to our assumption of a uniform distribution, and the resulting diﬀerence between the averages of
both groups, ¯ sH−¯ sL, is equal to 1/2 for all values of ˜ s. The expected wage gain for an individual
worker of being paired with a co-worker from group H is now given by A(¯ sH − ¯ sL)s = As/2,
and it follows immediately that this gain is increasing in an individual’s skill. With identical
migration cost for each individual, and assuming an interior solution, 0 < ˜ s < 1, it follows
that high-skilled individuals self-select into migrating abroad, while low-skilled individuals are
deterred from migration by the cost attached to it. For the indiﬀerent worker with skill ˜ s the






Self-selection into migration, ˜ s ∈ (0,1), then obviously requires c ∈ (0,A/2). Proposition 1
summarizes :
Proposition 1 With strictly positive but not prohibitively high migration cost, all workers with
skill s > ˜ slf = 2c/A migrate abroad, while all workers with skill s ≤ ˜ slf = 2c/A stay in their
home country. Migration ﬂows increase for a higher level of technology, A, and lower migration
cost, c.
Taking stock, our model is able to explain two-way, high-skilled migration ﬂows between two ex
ante and ex post symmetric countries, which are driven by the desire of high-skilled workers to
get separated from their low-skilled counterparts.
3 Welfare
In order to analyze the welfare eﬀects of migration, the natural comparison is the scenario of
prohibitive migration cost c ≥ A/2, which leads to ˜ s = 1 (the “autarky case"). The value of
aggregate production equals total wage income, which in turn is given by

















A[1 + ˜ s(1 − ˜ s)]
4
  (5)
6Total output is therefore minimized at autarky (˜ s = 1) and maximized if exactly half the
individuals become migrants (˜ s = 1/2). Aggregate welfare equals the diﬀerence between total
output and total migration cost:
W(˜ s,c) =
A[1 + ˜ s(1 − ˜ s)]
4
− c(1 − ˜ s)  (6)
We can now use the link between ˜ s and c provided by (4) to express aggregate welfare in the
laissez-faire equilibrium as a function of either variable:
Wlf(˜ s) =















Aggregate welfare is therefore maximized at autarky (˜ s = 1) and minimized if exactly half the










Figure 1: Laissez-faire equlibrium
Lastly, we look at individual welfare, which is identical to an individual’s expected wage








lf (˜ s,s) =
A(1 + ˜ s)s
2
− c =
A[s − ˜ s(1 − s)]
2
,
respectively. We see that all individuals are worse oﬀ than in the autarky equilibrium, where
the expected wage rate of an individual with skill s is equal to As/2. For non-migrants, this
simply happens because the pool of co-workers available for matching now has a lower average
skill. For migrants, this is explained by a negative external eﬀect induced by migration that
can best be seen by a thought experiment, in which individual migration occurs sequentially, in
the order of decreasing ability of migrants: Every migrant, apart from the most skilled one, in
this case reduces the average skill of individuals in the migrant pool, thereby inﬂicting losses on
infra-marginal migrants’ wages. This eﬀect is rationally ignored by individual migrants.
Figure 1 illustrates the results. The bottom quadrant shows how the migration cutoﬀ is
determined by the equality of migration cost and expected migration gain for the marginal
migrant. The top quadrant shows in bold the resulting wage proﬁle in the open economy as a
function of individual ability s, where for migrants a distinction is made between the gross wage
(bold dashed) and the net wage, which subtracts migration cost (bold solid). The wage proﬁle
in autarky is given by the thin solid line for comparison. Aggregate welfare is measured by the
area under the autarky wage proﬁle and open economy wage proﬁle, respectively.
The main welfare implications of high-skilled migration are summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 International migration leads to aggregate production gains, and to losses in
aggregate welfare. Furthermore, all individuals are worse oﬀ in a migration equilibrium than in
the autarky equilibrium.
We now look at the social planner equilibrium. The social planner can freely choose the migration
cutoﬀ, ˜ s, taking as given migration cost, c, but disregarding individuals’ migration incentives,
which link ˜ s to c in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Maximizing (6) with respect to ˜ s gives the









8Hence, while there is “too much” migration in the laissez-faire equilibrium due to the negative
migration externality, the optimal level of migration is strictly positive if migration costs are
suﬃciently low. Note also that ˜ ssoc > 1/2 and therefore it is never socially optimal to have more
than half the population emigrate. Finally, zero migration is enforced by the social planner













and it is easily checked that Wsoc(c) is strictly larger than autarky welfare A/4 for all non-
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Figure 2: Social planner equlibrium
We now look at the eﬀect that a socially optimal level of international migration has on
individual wages. Clearly, non-migrants are worse oﬀ with any level of high-skill emigration,
since the expected quality of their co-workers falls. Hence, we can restrict our attention to
9comparing the expected net wage of migrants in the social optimum with the respective wage




A(1 + ˜ ssoc)s
2
− c,
and, substituting for ˜ ssoc, it is immediate that there is a wage gain relative to autarky for
migrants with skill s > 4c/(4c + A). Simple algebra shows that this threshold value is strictly
smaller than ˜ ssoc as derived in (9), and therefore in the social optimum all migrants are better
oﬀ than under autarky. Figure 2, which is directly analogous to Figure 1 (but for expositional
purposes considers a smaller migration cost, c), illustrates. In constructing Figure 2, we use the
fact that from our results (4) and (9) we know that ˜ ssoc = ˜ slf + 1/2. Furthermore, the size of
the jump in the wage proﬁle in the upper quadrant at ˜ ssoc is determined by the the wage gain
for the marginal migrant, which is determined in the lower quadrant. Proposition 3 summarizes
the results:
Proposition 3 The socially optimal level of migration is lower than in the laissez-faire equi-
librium, if the latter features positive migration levels. For c < A/4 the socially optimal level
of migration is strictly positive. In the social optimum, all migrants are better oﬀ than under
autarky, while all non-migrants are worse oﬀ.
The social optimum can alternatively be implemented by a tax on migration by both countries.
In this case, individual incentives to migrate are again relevant, of course. We assume that a
country’s tax revenue is distributed equally to all nationals, independent of their residence, and
hence does not aﬀect the migration decision. Condition (4) now holds in a modiﬁed form, with




Substituting for ˜ s using ˜ ssoc from (9), this implies t = A/4. Since countries are identical and
the tax is imposed by both countries, it can alternatively be interpreted as an emigration tax
or an immigration tax.4
4Note that t exactly matches the diﬀerence between the wage gain from migration and the corresponding
migration costs at ˜ ssoc in Figure 2.
10We compare this scenario now with one where an immigration tax rate is set by a national
government that wants to maximize domestic (rather than global) welfare. Domestic welfare
equals the total wage bill of nationals, independent of their residential status, plus total transfer
income. The latter is ﬁnanced from immigration tax revenue, which is assumed to be distributed
equally to all nationals, and hence does not aﬀect their decision to emigrate. Since there is no
cross-matching between immigrants and natives in our model, domestic welfare is independent
of the number of immigrants. Hence the sole purpose of the immigration tax is to redistribute
income from immigrants to natives, and the tax rate tnoc is set at its revenue maximizing level:
tnoc = argmax
t





















Comparison to (4) and (9) shows that this migration cutoﬀ lies between the respective cutoﬀs
in the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum. Furthermore, the prohibitive migration
cost is equal to A/2, as in the laissez-faire equilibrium. At this level of migration cost, the
non-cooperative immigration tax, tnoc, is zero.
Aggregate welfare for each country in the non-cooperative equilibrium is given the diﬀerence
between the value of total output and total migration cost, as in the previous two cases con-
sidered. Tax revenue has no net eﬀect in the case where countries are symmetric. Substituting
(11) into (6) leads to















It is easily checked that welfare under non-cooperative tax setting
(i) approaches the social optimum for c → 0, and autarky welfare for c → A/2
(ii) is lower than welfare under autarky if and only if A/6 < c < A/2
(iii) is minimized for c = A/3
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Figure 3: Aggregate Welfare
Proposition 4 The bilateral migration ﬂows in the non-cooperative equilibrium are smaller
than in the laissez-faire equilibrium and larger than in the social optimum. Aggregate welfare is
higher than in the laissez-faire equilibrium, and also higher than in autarky if migration cost is
suﬃciently low.
Figure 3 illustrates the aggregate welfare results derived in this section.
4 Extensions
Two important characteristics of the model presented in sections 2 and 3 are that (i) internation-
ally mobile labour is the only factor of production, and that (ii) countries are ex ante identical
in all respects. We now check the robustness of our results by changing those key assumptions.
In section 4.1 we add an internationally immobile factor of production to the model. In section
124.2 we consider country asymmetries in our benchmark model without an immobile factor.
4.1 Internationally immobile factors of production
In this subsection, we add internationally immobile capital to our model. Capital is modeled
as an essential input in all ﬁrms, and hence we introduce an interaction between migrants and
domestic factors of production that is standard in most migration models, but has not been a
feature of our basic model. The production technology is unchanged with respect to labour,
i.e. there are two tasks, which have to be performed by exactly one worker each, and following
Kremer (1993) we assume that capital is combined with labour in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. The
resulting production function is given by
y = f (s1,s2,k) = 2As1s2kα, (14)
with α ∈ [0,1] denoting the partial production elasticity of capital and k being the per capita
capital stock used in production. With ﬁrms knowing only the average skill within the groups,
L and H, lemma 1 implies positive assortative matching of group members. We can therefore
separately write down the reduced form proﬁt maximization problem of both types of ﬁrms as
max
kℓ
πℓ (kℓ) = 2A¯ s2
ℓkα
ℓ − 2w(¯ sℓ) − rkℓ ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H}  (15)
The proﬁt maximising level of capital depends on whether the ﬁrm employs individuals from






! = 0 ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H}, (16)
and we get the standard result that the rate of return to capital, r, equals its value marginal
product. Using equation (16) in combination with the full employment condition
¯ k = ˜ skL + (1 − ˜ s)kH, (17)
13as well as ¯ sL = ˜ s/2 and ¯ sH = (1+˜ s)/2 allows us to solve for the amount of capital used by ﬁrms
solely employing natives or migrants, respectively:
kL =
"
˜ s + (1 − ˜ s)
￿








(1 − ˜ s) + ˜ s
￿
˜ s





and it is easily checked that kH ≥ ¯ k ≥ kL. Hence, ﬁrms employing workers of a higher expected
ability, which in equilibrium will be ﬁrms employing migrants, have a higher capital intensity.
In analogy to section 2, wages are determined by splitting available revenue (now the dif-
ference between total ﬁrm revenue and payments to capital) equally between the two workers.
The expected wage of a worker with ability s is then given by
wℓ (s) = A¯ sℓs(1 − α)kα
ℓ ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H}, (20)
using (15), (16) and the fact that proﬁts are zero due to perfect competition and free market
entry. Capital returns are distributed equally among the nationals of a country, and hence
capital ownership does not distort the decision to migrate. In analogy to the baseline model,
the laissez-faire migration equilibrium is then determined by the condition that the wage gain
for the marginal migrant is equal to the migration cost. We get
˜ slf =
2c
A(1 − α)¯ kα (Φ)
−1 (21)
with











where the inequality is strict whenever α > 0. Comparison with (4) shows that the relative
size of the laissez-faire migration cutoﬀs in the two models depends on two eﬀects. A larger
value for (1−α)¯ kα increases migration ﬂows since the migration cost falls in relation to average
income. The second eﬀect is given by Φ−1, and it shows that an additional incentive to migrate
exists in the extended model, which stems from the reallocation of domestic capital towards
ﬁrms employing (more productive) migrants.
Turning to the welfare implications that migration has in the framework described above it
can be shown that, as it was the case in the baseline model, migration increases total output in
14both countries. Deriving Ylf (˜ s) ≥ Y (1) analytically requires a lengthy proof which is delegated
to the appendix. However, the intuition for this result should be clear. Migration not only leads
to a more eﬃcient matching of workers within their groups it also enables a more proﬁtable
use of capital which can be reallocated toward more productive ﬁrms and therefore unleashes
additional eﬃciency gains.
Figure 4: Aggregate welfare in a model with capital
For aggregate welfare the negative aspects of migration no longer dominate. Going through
the same steps as in the baseline model, we ﬁnd that aggregate welfare in the laissez-faire







2Φ(1 − α)¯ kα − kα
H
￿






15and it is easily checked that autarky welfare is equal to W(1,α) = A¯ kα/4. We can now
compute the relative welfare levels in the migration equilibrium and in autarky, ω (˜ s,α) ≡
Wlf (˜ s,α)/W (1,α), where aggregate migration gains exist whenever ω(˜ s,α) > 1.
Figure 4 plots ω (˜ s,α) for all combinations of ˜ s and α, where combinations that lead to
ω (˜ s,α) > 1 are highlighted in the ﬁgure by a grid surface. All other combinations lead to
aggregate welfare losses from migration. We ﬁnd that in contrast to our baseline model that
abstracts from complementarities in production between internationally mobile and immobile
factors, there exists now a non-trivial parameter space where welfare losses from the negative
migration externality are overcompensated by the eﬃciency gains resulting from the reallocation
of capital towards migrant-employing ﬁrms. The results are summarised as follows:
Proposition 5 International migration leads to aggregate production gains. For high (low)
values of α the model features aggregate welfare gains (losses).
Turning to the social planner’s solution, one can show that the socially optimal level of migration
will be lower than the one in the laissez faire equilibrium given by equation (21).5 It is easy to
see why: Adding capital to the model opens up a new channel for gains from migration, but does
not add a new distortion. Hence, the migration externality discussed in the previous section
remains the only distortion in the model. As an immediate consequence migration levels in the
laissez faire equilibrium will in general be too high.
4.2 Country-speciﬁc technology
We now introduce country asymmetries to our baseline model without capital by assuming
A
D  = A
F, where A
D denotes the technology level of the domestic economy while A
F refers to
the corresponding technology parameter in the foreign economy. Recalling equation (3), the










1 + ˜ sj
￿
˜ sj − c ∀ j,l ∈ {D,F} with j  = l, (23)
5The formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
16in which we have used ¯ s
j
L = ˜ sj/2 and ¯ s
j









2 + 8(Al − Aj)c
2(Aj − Al)
∀ j,l ∈ {D,F} with j  = l  (24)
It is now easy to check that the technologically superior country experiences net immigration, i.e.
for Al > Aj we have ˜ sl
lf > ˜ s
j
lf. Moreover, taking the total diﬀerential of equation (23) with respect
to ˜ s
j












∂Al, if countries are not too dissimilar,
i.e. 2/3 < A
D/A
F < 3/2. This is the case we focus on henceforth. Thus, emigration increases
if the technology in the destination country gets better while it falls if the same occurs in the
source country. For higher cost of migration, c, the ﬂows of workers between both economies
decline. The prohibitive level migration cost is now also country-speciﬁc: Setting ˜ s
j
lf = 1 in (24),
we ﬁnd that emigration occurs from country j whenever c < (2Al − Aj)/2.
Turning to the welfare implications of migration, aggregate output of nationals from country













1 + ˜ sj ￿
1 − ˜ sj￿￿
4
, (25)
with j,l ∈ {D,F} and j  = l. In an equilibrium with strictly positive migration levels, aggregate
output produced by the natives of country j is higher than under autarky if (25) is larger than














1 + ˜ sj ￿




1 − ˜ sj
￿
c, (26)
for all j,l ∈ {D,F} with j  = l. In analogy to the baseline model we can use the link between
migration cost and the laissez-faire migration cutoﬀ in (24) to express aggregate welfare as a

































2 + 8(Al − Aj)c
8(Al − Aj)
  (28)
17Migration leads to aggregate welfare gains for the natives of country j whenever (27) is maximised
for ˜ sj < 1. In this case, (28) can be used to derive the necessary condition for the migration
cost. We ﬁnd the following results:
Proposition 6 Migration generates aggregate production gains for the natives of both countries.
Aggregate welfare is lower in a migration equilibrium than under autarky for nationals of the
country with the better technology. For nationals of the technologically inferior country, aggregate
welfare gains from migration exist if migration costs are suﬃciently low.
Proof See the appendix.
From the baseline model we know that aggregate welfare in a migration equilibrium is driven
by two facts. On the one hand, there are output gains from more eﬃcient matching at labor
markets, while, on the other hand, the negative migration externality induces too much migra-
tion, such that in the case of identical countries output gains are completely eaten up migration
cost. Allowing for country asymmetries adds an additional source for welfare gains or losses.
By migrating to another country migrants might gain (lose) by accessing a superior (inferior)
production technology. Not surprising there exist no aggregate welfare gains for nationals from
the technological superior country, since they have to give up their technologically advantage
when going abroad. Conversely nationals from the technologically inferior country may gain in
the aggregate from the better technology access, provided migration cost is not too high and,
hence, the negative external eﬀect of migration is not too strong.
As in the baseline model, we now turn to the social planner’s solution. The migration










2 + 3(Al + 4c)(Al − Aj)
3(Aj − Al)
∀ j,l ∈ {D,F} with j  = l  (29)
Note that the socially optimal migration cutoﬀ, ˜ sj
soc, has the same basic properties as the
migration cutoﬀ in the laissez faire equilibrium, ˜ s
j
lf. More precisely, we have ˜ sl
soc > ˜ sj
soc for
Al > Aj and ∂˜ s
j
soc
∂c > 0 as well as ∂˜ s
j
soc
∂Aj > 0 > ∂˜ s
j
soc
∂Al , provided that countries are not too
18dissimilar,6 i.e. 3/4 < A
D/A
F < 4/3. Comparing the socially optimal migration cutoﬀ, ˜ sj
soc,
with the one obtained in the laissez faire equilibrium, ˜ s
j
lf, results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The socially optimal levels of migration are lower than in the laissez-faire equi-
librium, if the latter features positive migration levels.
Proof See the appendix.
According to proposition 7 the main result from the baseline model continues to hold also in
the richer environment of asymmetric countries. As before the individual migrant rationally
ignores the negative external eﬀect of his migration decision on the average skill of natives and
other migrants, such that in the laissez faire equilibrium too much migration occurs. Taking the
biased incentive structure in a model with country asymmetries into account the social planner
corrects for the migration externality by setting lower migration levels than in the laissez faire
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model that can explain two-way migration of high-skilled
individuals between countries at the same level of economic development. The baseline model is
extremely simple, but for this very reason it is transparent as well, and it furthermore lends itself
to a comprehensive welfare analysis. We identify a negative externality from migration, resulting
from the fact that the marginal migrant ignores the negative eﬀect his migration decision has on
expected wages of both natives and migrants. As a consequence, there is too much migration in
the laissez-faire equilibrium with positive migration cost, and aggregate welfare is lower than in
autarky. We even ﬁnd that all individuals in this case lose from migration. This does not mean,
6Note that the parameter constraint given here is more restrictive than the one imposed on equation (24).
However, there is a simple explanation for this. Suppose we have the case of either 2 3 < A
D A
F < 3 4 or
4 3 < A
D A
F < 3 2. It is then easy to show that the social planner would not allow emigration from the
technologically superior country irrespective of the underlying migration cost, c, and hence chooses ˜ s
j
soc = 1 for
A
j > A
l. As a consequence the comparative static results derived above are no longer valid for ˜ s
j
soc = 1, but
continue to hold for ˜ s
l
soc.
19however, that all migration is socially harmful. We ﬁnd that if migration cost is suﬃciently
low, a social planner would choose strictly positive migration levels. The negative migration
externality in this case has to be traded oﬀ against the better quality of matches within ﬁrms
that can be achieved due to the existence of a well-deﬁned high-skill group, comprising the
migrants.
Aggregate gains from migration re-emerge as a possible feature of the laissez-faire equilibrium
once our baseline framework is amended by standard features known from other migration
models. Once we introduce a second factor of production that is internationally immobile and a
complement to labour in the production function, aggregate gains from migration exist despite
the persistent negative externality, provided the income share of this factor is suﬃciently high
and migration cost is suﬃciently low. The welfare gains in this case result from a more eﬃcient
domestic allocation of internationally immobile factors of production, notably in the absence
of any country asymmetries that would normally be responsible for positive welfare eﬀects of
migration.
Allowing for country asymmetries in form of small technology diﬀerences allows workers
from the technologically inferior country to realize additional gains from migration by accessing
a better technology. As a consequence we ﬁnd two-way, high-skilled migration which is biased
towards the technologically superior country. Gaining a better technology access, additionally
pushes the wages of migrants from the low-tech country, such that for workers from this country
aggregate welfare gains may arise even in the laissez faire equilibrium. This should, however, not
hide the fact that due the negative migration externality aggregate welfare in the laissez faire
equilibrium will be still smaller than in the social planner’s solution which features restricted
migration.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of lemma 1
In order to prove lemma 1 it suﬃces to show that given production function (1) ﬁrms optimally
decide to match only workers of the same expected skill, such that ¯ si = ¯ sℓ with i = 1,2 and
20ℓ ∈ {L,H}. The simple proof presented here is taken from Basu (1997, pp. 35). For a more
general proof of positive assortative matching see Becker (1991, p. 130) or Sattinger (1975).
Consider two diﬀerent arbitrary average skill levels, ¯ sL and ¯ sH, with ¯ sH > ¯ sL. A ﬁrm facing
optimization problem (2) now has three diﬀerent possibilities of pairing workers:
π (¯ sH, ¯ sH) = 2A¯ s2
H − 2w(¯ sH), (A.1)
π (¯ sL, ¯ sL) = 2A¯ s2
L − 2w(¯ sL), (A.2)
π (¯ sH, ¯ sL) = 2A¯ sH¯ sL − w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL)  (A.3)
Let us ﬁrst suppose π (¯ sH, ¯ sL) ≥ π (¯ sH, ¯ sH) which results in the following chain of inequalities
2A¯ sH¯ sL − w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL) ≥ 2A¯ s2
H − 2w(¯ sH), (A.4)
2A¯ sH (¯ sH − ¯ sL) ≤ w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL), (A.5)
2A¯ sL (¯ sH − ¯ sL) < w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL), (A.6)
2A¯ sH¯ sL − w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL) < 2A¯ s2
L − 2w(¯ sL), (A.7)
where ¯ sH > ¯ sL has been utilized to derive inequality (A.6) from (A.5). Note that inequality
(A.7) implies π (¯ sL, ¯ sL) ≥ π (¯ sH, ¯ sL). Now imagine π (¯ sL, ¯ sH) ≥ π (¯ sL, ¯ sL) giving rise to
2A¯ sH¯ sL − w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL) ≥ 2A(¯ sL)
2 − 2w(¯ sL), (A.8)
2A¯ sL (¯ sH − ¯ sL) ≥ w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL), (A.9)
2A¯ sH (¯ sH − ¯ sL) > w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL), (A.10)
2A(¯ sH)
2 − 2w(¯ sH) > 2A¯ sH¯ sL − w(¯ sH) − w(¯ sL), (A.11)
where again ¯ sH > ¯ sL has been utilized to derive inequality (A.10) from (A.9). Inequality (A.11)
implies π (¯ sH, ¯ sH) ≥ π (¯ sH, ¯ sL). Taking stock proﬁts from positive assortative matching always
surpass proﬁts from cross matching, such that ﬁrms always decide to pair workers of identical
skill, i.e. ¯ si = ¯ sℓ.
216.2 Proof of aggregate output gains from migration
In order to show that output in a migration equilibrium is at least as high as in an autarky
equilibrium
Ylf (˜ s) = ˜ sYL (˜ s) + (1 − ˜ s)YH (˜ s) ≥ Y (1), (A.12)
must hold, where Yℓ (˜ s) ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H} is total output of ﬁrms employing only type ℓ workers.
By inspection of (15) and (16) it follows that αYℓ (˜ s) = rlf (˜ s)kℓ ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H}, as well as
αY (1) = r(1)¯ k for ˜ s = 1. In combination with ¯ k = ˜ skL+(1 − ˜ s)kH, which follows from the full
employment condition (17), the above relationships can be used to rewrite equation (A12) as
rlf (˜ s) ≥ r(1)  (A.13)
Using expression (18) in combination with ¯ sH = 1+˜ s
2 in equation (16) allows to solve for
rlf (˜ s) = ψ (α, ˜ s)
1−α Aα
2




which holds true if
ψ (α, ˜ s) ≡
￿
1 − ˜ s2
￿
(1 + ˜ s)
1+α
1−α + ˜ s2˜ s
1+α
1−α ≥ 1  (A.15)
Note that ψ (α, ˜ s) ≥ 1 ∀ α, ˜ s ∈ [0,1] if ψ (0, ˜ s) ≥ 1 and
∂ψ(α,˜ s)
∂α ≥ 0 ∀ α, ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. It is easy to
verify that
ψ (0, ˜ s) = 1 + ˜ s(1 − ˜ s) ≥ 1 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1]  (A.16)
Furthermore note that





1 − ˜ s2￿
ln(1 + ˜ s)(1 + ˜ s)
1+α





2 ≥ 0, (A.17)
requires
￿
1 − ˜ s2
￿
ln(1 + ˜ s)(1 + ˜ s)
1+α




1 − ˜ s2
￿
ln(1 + ˜ s)(1 + ˜ s)
1+α




where we have exploited the fact that the ﬁrst term in inequality above is positive while ln(˜ s) ≤
0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. The inequality above can be transformed into
ζ (˜ s) ≥ ξ (˜ s), (A.19)
22with
ζ (˜ s) ≡ ln(1 + ˜ s) ≥ 0 and ξ (˜ s) ≡ ˜ s2 ln
￿




for all ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. Note that ζ (˜ s) ≥ ξ (˜ s) ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1], if ζ (0) = ξ (0), ζ (1) = ξ (1), ζ′ (˜ s) > 0,
ξ′ (˜ s) ≥ 0 as well as ζ′′ (˜ s) < 0 < ξ′′ (˜ s) ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. Figure 4 illustrates the speciﬁcation




ΖHs  L, ΞHs  L
Ζ Hs  L
Ξ Hs  L
Figure 5: Illustration of ζ (˜ s) ≥ ξ (˜ s)
for ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. We start with ζ (0) = 0 which follows immediately from (A.20). Note that for
lim˜ s→0 ξ (˜ s) a undeﬁned expression results. In order to use De l’hôpital’s rule we introduce
χ(˜ s) ≡ ln
￿
1 + ˜ s
˜ s
￿
and η (˜ s) ≡
1
˜ s2, (A.21)
with ξ (˜ s) = χ(˜ s)/η (˜ s). Now applying De l’hôpital’s rule yields
lim
˜ s→0










2(1 + ˜ s)
#
= 0, (A.22)
such that ζ (0) = ξ (0) is fulﬁlled. By inspection of (A.20) it follows that ζ (1) = ξ (1) = ln(2) >
0. In the next step we compute ζ′ (˜ s) = 1/(1 + ˜ s) > 0 for all ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. Not that in order to
23show that ξ′ (˜ s) ≥ 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1] we can express ξ′ (˜ s) as
ξ′ (˜ s) = ˜ s[δ (˜ s) − γ (˜ s)], (A.23)
with
δ (˜ s) ≡ 2ln
￿
1 + ˜ s
˜ s
￿
> 0 and γ (˜ s) ≡
1
1 + ˜ s
> 0  (A.24)
Note that ξ′ (˜ s) ≥ 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1] requires δ (0) > γ (0), δ (1) > γ (1) and δ′ (˜ s),γ′ (˜ s) < 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈
[0,1]. We ﬁnd lim˜ s→0 δ (˜ s) → ∞ and γ (0) = 1 as well as δ (1) = 2ln(2) > γ (1) = 1
2.
Furthermore note that δ′ (˜ s) = −2/[(1 + ˜ s) ˜ s] < 0 and γ′ (˜ s) = −1/(1 + ˜ s)
2 < 0. Hence
ξ′ (˜ s) ≥ 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. When computing the second derivatives of ξ (˜ s) and ζ (˜ s), we ﬁnd
ζ′′ (˜ s) = −1/(1 + ˜ s)
2 < 0, while ξ′′ (˜ s) can be written as
ξ′′ (˜ s) = ρ(˜ s) − λ(˜ s), (A.25)
with
ρ(˜ s) ≡ 2ln
￿





(1 + ˜ s)
2 and λ ≡ (˜ s)
3
1 + ˜ s
  (A.26)
As before it suﬃce to show that ρ(0) > λ(0), ρ(1) > λ(1) and ρ′ (˜ s),λ′ (˜ s) < 0. By inspection of
(A.26) it follows that lim˜ s→0 ρ(˜ s) → ∞ and λ(0) = 3 as well as ρ(1) = 2ln(2)+ 1
4 > λ(1) = 3
2.
Furthermore note that
ρ′ (˜ s) =
˜ s − 2(1 + ˜ s)
2 − ˜ s3
(1 + ˜ s)
3 ˜ s
< 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1], (A.27)
λ′ (˜ s) = −
3
(1 + ˜ s)
2 < 0, (A.28)
which implies ξ′′ (˜ s) > 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1]. It follows that rlf (˜ s) ≥ r(1) and Ylf (˜ s) ≥ Y (1).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of proposition 6 proceeds in two steps. Before proving the statements concerning
aggregate welfare we ﬁrst turn to the proof of the results regarding aggregate output. In order
to show that Y j ￿
˜ sj￿











1 − ˜ sj
￿
≥ 0, (A.29)
24where Y j ￿
˜ sj￿
has been substituted from equation (25), while Y j (1) = Aj/4. Clearly for Al ≥ Aj
























which holds whenever 1/2 ≤ AD/AF ≤ 2 and hence completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Now we prove that Wj ￿
˜ sj￿
≤ Wj (1) = Aj/4 ∀ Aj ≥ Al. Note that for ˜ sj = 1 we obtain
Wj (1) = Aj/4 from equation (27). Using this together with Wj ￿
˜ sj￿
















1 + ˜ sj
￿


















where the last line is non-positive whenever 1 +
￿
˜ sj￿3 − 2
￿
˜ sj￿2 ≥ 0 and Aj ≥ Al. Since 1 +
￿
˜ sj￿3 − 2
￿
˜ sj￿2 has a local maximum at ˜ sj = 0 and intersects the abscissa at ˜ sj = 1 and
˜ s = 1/2±
p




˜ sj￿2 ≥ 0 ∀ ˜ s ∈ [0,1] and, hence, Wj ￿
˜ sj￿
≤ Wj (1) ∀ Aj ≥
Al. In order to complete the proof of proposition 6 it remains to show that for Al > Aj we
have Wj (c) ≥ Aj/4 ∀ 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
4
￿
2Al − 3Aj +
q
4(Al)
2 − 8AjAl + 5(Aj)
2
￿




2Al − 3Aj +
q
4(Al)
2 − 8AjAl + 5(Aj)
2
￿





. Using equation (28)












2Al − 3Aj +
q
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2Al − 3Aj −
q
4(Al)




Note that since 2/3 < A
D/A
F < 3/2, soltution (A.34) is negative and therefore economically
irrelevant. Solution (A.32) equals the prohibitive migration cost at which ˜ sj = 1. Finally, it
is easily checked that 0 < 1
4
￿
2Al − 3Aj +
q
4(Al)









equation (28) implies W (0) = Al/4 > Aj/4 we can immediately infer that for low migration cost,
i.e. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
4
￿
2Al − 3Aj +
q
4(Al)
2 − 8AjAl + 5(Aj)
2
￿
aggregate welfare gains exist, while
25for high migration cost, 1
4
￿
2Al − 3Aj +
q
4(Al)
2 − 8AjAl + 5(Aj)
2
￿







6.4 Proof of Proposition 7
In order to show that ˜ sj
soc > ˜ s
j
lf we have to consider two scenarios where either Aj > Al or
Aj < Al. We start with Aj < Al which allows us to rewrite ˜ sj




















thus, completes the ﬁrst part of the proof. Now suppose Aj > Al, such that ˜ sj

































where we have made use of the fact that 2
3Aj < Al < Aj. The last inequality in (A.36) holds






0 ≤ c ≤ 1
2Al for 2
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